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Economics and the Theory of Global Democracy¹

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Introduction

My Theory of Global Democracy holds a principle, the fourth, which regards the realm of economics. It is the last of the four principles that form the Theory. Such principle affirms that: “No matter the political party or the party coalition currently at the government in a given state, that state must engage to respect the quote of development assigned to it by the United Nations”, once the United Nations be adequately reformed. The question of the reform of United Nations in a democratic sense has been treated elsewhere, as well as the historical, political, and philosophical aspects of my Theory, therefore illustrating it does not belong to the ends of the present contribution. Of course, a reference to it will be done the same, and the same for the complex of the whole Theory in the *Argument* section. Here, I just deepen the study of the economic aspects of my Theory of Global Democracy.

I need two historic and theoretical premises that are related, the first, to the identification of the economic factors in the economic theory, the second, to the construction of the principal political-economical categories of the same theory, the GDP *in primis*. The aim of these two premises, developed in this *Introduction*, is that to give adequate importance to the International Relations in the economic-financial life of a given State and in the economic-financial relations among the States. The *Argument* section will follow; it is formed by my original reasoning on the nexus between politics and economics at the international level. I see such reasoning as a coherent development of the theory of democracy by John Dewey in the current epoch of globalization. Along with this point, the *Argument* section puts in relation the fourth principles of my Theory with the other three ones that are *before* it, to show the coherence of the whole theoretical project. Finally, both the *Argument* section and the *Conclusion* section will give some elements of reasonable prevision of a concrete praxis of my Theory.

Historic-theoretical Premise No.1: The economic theory identifies the economic factors – capital, land, and work – since its seizing as a science in the 18th century. Along with the economic factors, the market represents a pivot through which the economic life of a country becomes concrete, given that it is in it that those factors animate and activate. In the 20th century other two economic factors have been identified, technology and human capital that consists of health and education of the

citizens/workers/consumers. The economy by alone, however, is unable to implement the productive life and the exchanges within a community and between communities, then there is the need of the currency and finally of the bank.

I would like to draw the attention on the historical side of that theoretical elaboration that, from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman and Walt Rostow, took around a century and half. I tribute a lot of importance to the fact that, in the same moment in which those authors built up their theories, the world was politically divided into two parts, free countries and colonized countries. The International Relations existing between the first and the second group of countries were of a power kind, while the relations between the free countries alone were of concurrence.

Historic-theoretical Premise No. 2: In the following dates, the economical-financial science enriched with conceptions that are of use still nowadays in the normal treatment of the questions related to production, distribution, and equality. **1911:** Corrado Gini publishes his instrument to measuring inequality of distribution of wealth inside a country - 0 to 1, minimum to maximum inequality. It became universally known as the "Gini coefficient". **1936:** John M. Keynes introduces the formula that represents the wealth of a State, its GDP, by the following equation: $(y) = C + G + I + (X - M)$, where

C = final consume

G = State expenditures

I = private investments

X = exportations

M = importations.

The wealth of a State is measured in terms of GDP that is the mass of goods and services produced in one year in its national territory by the nation and by foreign investors. It is *Gross*, in the sense that the *Net* one is the GDP less its 10% for the expenditure of amortization of physical capital, and *Domestic*, because it excludes goods and services produced by that nation *abroad*.

1955: Simon Kuznets introduces the graphic that visualizes the growth-standard of a country, then become known as the “Kuznets curve”. 1960: Walt Rostow publishes a complete theory of the economic development, through stages that should be observed *always*, normatively, in the history of a whatsoever country. **In the same year**, Milton Friedman exposes his complete theory of the currency, the “monetarism”.

From the '70s of the 20th century, the finance of a State enters the calculation of its GDP.

Also in the *Premise No. 2*, my attention goes to the historic aspects of the International Relations. Moving from the consideration that the first national bank in the world history is that of the UK (created in 1694), I note that all the characteristics that form the notion of wealth of a whatsoever State are identified and put together during the years in which those Relations are – I repeat it – either of power (between free countries and colonized ones), or of concurrence (between free countries alone).

Those two *Premises* help me to focus a fundamental political-economic notion: a contemporary state is characterized fundamentally by elements that are political (territory, population, government, army, administration, justice, parliament) and economic (central bank, market, factories, welfare). Today we have around 200 States in the world and *there is no human community that does not share a State-form*. Briefly, the *State* is today the *normal form* of each human community. In addition, around all States form the United Nations and inside the General Assembly of this Organization each of them enjoys equality of vote, no matter their territorial extension, demography, or government. Beyond that formal equality, nevertheless, the real inequality among them *determines* in many ways all the political and economic elements that form every State. *It is that element of causality*, which draws from International Relations all along their history, that my Theory of Global Democracy stresses as its own *fil rouge*.

Argument

1. The world as we today know it comes from the decolonization period, the years between 1960 and 1975. In fact, as we already said, unless Taiwan and some other political organizations that do not enjoy the recognition as a State, all human

communities today have a State-form and are represented within the United Nations. *In theory*, that means that each of the around 200 States today existing holds all the elements that we saw in the two *historic-theoretical Premises*. *In the real world*, the concrete substance of all those political and economic elements are *not* determined by the history of a given State *only*, or by its domestic life that is the life that passes from one generation to the future one inside its domestic boundaries, *but also* by the International Relations, within which each State shares a specific place and enjoys or suffers of advantages or disadvantages. Of course, such a situation draws from the international history and is the result of both the internal and *external* factors of the life of each State.

From *this* point of view, one could extrapolate the following note. Up to 1991, world scheme consisted of three big fronts, the Western one led by the USA, the “Communist” one led by the USSR, and the Third World, officially neutral. However, after that year, that scheme simplified because Cold War finished, and the new regime of globalization implemented. From one side, the USA remained as the biggest super-power on the scene, even if China marched toward a position of first magnitude on the same world spot. Nevertheless, over the time, the existence of mid-level powers, ever more important, like Russia, India, and Brazil, made room for the seizing of a multipolar system, and that complicated terrifically the whole picture.

From an economic point of view, a more specific consideration is needed. All along the years of Cold War, the two economic systems around the “Iron Curtain” were overwhelmingly non-communicating between themselves. As it regards the Non-Aligned countries, they often depended on the favors or the punishments, in terms of market of their own goods and resources, which they got due to the international position that they assumed regarding the disputes on the table. The USSR could consider the “satellite countries” in East Europe, Cuba in the Americas (just under the USA), Angola, Somalia, and Ethiopia in Africa, and the “Communist” regimes in Asia, like Vietnam, China, and North Korea (even if with important *distinguos*), as its strategic allies. On its side, the USA embraced a much larger continental space, from “home garden”, as Latin America was told at that time, to West Europe, from most Africa (eventually to co-manage with West Europe, the best partner) to most Asia, above all Middle East, India, and Pakistan. In a certain sense, one can affirm that, while

the world interests of the USSR were above all political and strategic, the interests of the USA were not only political and strategic, *but also, and above all, economic.*

The USA political and economic interests intertwined and, as they generated allied social strata in the States of the “Rest of the world”, they created pivotal points of reference *outside* the USA, inside other States’ governments, and political, social, and cultural elites. By the way, such dynamic does exist since the foundation of the USA and involved Latin America *in primis*, but step by step also Europe, Asia, and finally Africa.

After the First World War, and above all after the Second one, the influence of the USA economic actors implemented and became thicker through *intelligence* tools like the CIA, therefore expanded importantly all the world over. The strict relationship between the economic-capitalistic system and the political-democratic system of the USA assured to its economic-political whole a huge, internal as well as external consensus. Such a consensus was never put in discussion unless big scandals broke the national and the international trust to the capitalistic-democratic system, or when a golpe, ad hoc organized by the CIA or a war, unchained just to clear egoistic ends, tore the mask out of what since the ‘50s of the past century was called the USA “industrial-military system”.

In addition, after the Second World War, the USA economy and finance benefited, all over the globe, of the centrality of the dollar established by the constitution of the economic and financial International Organizations, like IMF and WB, in 1946. First, the euro-dollars in the ‘60s, then the petro-dollars in the ‘70s, such centrality never diminished. However, the world debt crisis in 1982 marked an important step in the evolution of the USA political and economic *grippe* all over the Planet. In fact, when it became clear that above all the African countries were not able to refund the debts signed with the USA, the corporations, both Europeans and of the USA, directly assumed the management of the economic policies of the indebted countries. Post-Mao China, on its side, had already identified in the “market socialism” a “needy” pragmatic adjustment of the Communist doctrine in front of Capitalism – in truth, a recognition of the superiority and efficiency of the capitalistic-democratic system led by the USA upon the Rest of the world. Such a change at the guide of the globalization, from the governmental agencies of international aid to corporations, did not change

obviously the nature of the world capitalistic system, on the opposite, deepened it. Thanks to the Washington Consensus in 1989, that system welcomed the Latin-American countries finally free from totalitarianisms (or, like Chile, next to freedom) in the “democratic world”. The globalization dynamic enriched in that way, just to complete with the collapse of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in 1991.

Seen from the distance of thirty years from 1991, the globalization dynamic here described appears as a logic, political sequence of events that hardly could happen differently as they occurred. *But a different course of events was not impossible.* After the European stagflation of the ‘70s, the defeat of the syndical movement, the deregulation of the ‘80s, the transformation from Fordism to Toyotism (that is, the delocalization of the productive processes), up to the entrance of the countries once Soviet into the IMF and WB basket of client-States in the ‘90s, the capitalistic-democratic system of the USA more and more influenced and curved the economic and financial life of all countries in accordance with its own needs of growth. The same *Glorious Thirties* in Europe, that is the 1945-1975 years, do not seem nothing else that the *happy story* of the Welfare State ‘conceded’ to some client-States already beneficiaries of the post-War “Marshall Plan” just to make them ever closer to the “center” – ‘democracy’ as an aesthetic maquillage. In truth, the USA political-economic elites globalized the “international division of the work” according to its needs and vision. By this way, the workers classes of different countries and their governments needed to concur among themselves to catch the “work quotes” determined and defined in that way. It is then obvious that such a world condition, that is such a kind of globalization, definitively fractioned and weakened not only the international front of the workers in face that of the entrepreneurs, but also the international front of nations governments impeded to unite.

Beyond the collapse of the USSR, other two events of great importance at the beginning of the ‘90s have been the adoption by the United Nations of a large agenda of democratization (“decent work for all”, ILO; “education for all”, UNESCO; “health for all”, WHO; “human development”, UNDP) and Iraq war. Nevertheless, beyond those evident events, Capitalism’s *grippe* over the world globalized thanks to tools like the “development aids”, that is the conditioned loans, and the “Foreign Direct Investments”. By first tool, the governments that needed liquidity or that were induced

to take a loan from the international financial Institutions supported by OECD and Paris Club, have been conditioned to adopt social policies that, in the name of the fight on corruption, the promotion of the administrative efficiency, and the rule of law, substantially transferred money from Welfare policies to the efficiency of productive system. If that set diminished inflation, from one side, from the other lowered the expectations of the workers to see respected their rights as citizens (the so-called *austerity*). Curbing in that way the policies of the governments that benefited of the international loans, independently from which kind of government in charge, a tension between globalization and democracy developed since then, which the political scientists all over the world diligently identified as the principal focus of the political life in the '90s and beyond. The international mobility of workers from South to North of the Planet in search of job has been the most evident consequence of that international political regime.

The "Foreign Direct Investments" have been the mean through which corporations directly managed the levers of the extraction of the raw resources and the agrarian and industrial production of all countries in the world, as well as the internal markets. In that way, they controlled strictly the policies of all governments. Becoming familiar and influencing parties and political elites in all States up to the point of conditioning electoral campaigns, political programs, and their eventual implementations became a globalized "political" practice. Attracting investments in one's own country, in fact, is today the absolute priority of every government in whatever State since population needs work. On the other side, the electoral bodies in every country judge the capacity to remain at the country's guide of a government just from the result of that kind of international race to catch quotes of jobs, not caring that such race is in favor of capital. In fact, attracting capital in the homeland presupposes political measures such as a low or zero presence of syndicates, the detaxation of the committed capital, and other advantages for the investors. Finally, the privatization of goods once for free and at disposal of the whole population – take, for instance, the drinkable water and, in general, a safe environment – has been the most evident and direct consequence of that situation. As denounced by Naomi Klein in her report of 1999, *No Logo*, all that was a true economic-financial colonization of the 'world of life' of each of the six-seven billions of inhabitants of the Planet.

Nevertheless, just in the year of publication of *No Logo*, China adhered to the new WTO, World Trade Organization, seeing in that a way to ensure a solution to its huge population looking for a job – let us consider that Chinese population does not live only in China, but spread all the Planet. To tackle this point of its political-economic agenda, China's government projected to lead globalization, establishing rule of transparency and anti-corruption that are clear enough to be applied by a government well-willing – that is the opposite of what the supporters of the Western version of the globalization, fearing the “distorting” intervention of the State in economics, do recommend.

Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly raised the USA public debt – and that is for sure the event that got a world economic meaning more than the other ones of the epoch, including the 1998 South-East economic crisis, the war in Congo (1997-2003), power's taking by Putin in Russia (2000), the attack to the Twin Towers in New York (2001), the Argentinian crisis (2001), Enron's scandal (2001), the turning to the left of Brazil and other Latin-American countries (2002), the growing gap between the rich and the poor in South Africa, and the colored Revolutions in Ukraine and other countries of the Independent States Community (2004). China acquired a huge part of USA public debt step by step, so that it became a power able to interface directly with the Western super-power.

The great economic-financial crisis in 2007 started just from the USA and invested all the world. It is worthwhile to note that 2007 is the same year in which Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa took the initiative to constitute a supra-regional bloc, the BRICS, enlarging the previous Chinese initiative of the SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In addition, by that way those countries went beyond the level of macro-regions like European Union, African Union, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. Now, the BRICS, even if holding governments of different political orientation and obliged to respect other different alliances to which they previously adhered, endorsed with the mission to represent all over the world a “narration” of the world reality that is explicitly *diverse* from that, dominant, of the West – and for that reason they created a new bank of investments *alternative* to the IMF as well. On 11th April 2022, the news is that the RMB, that already in 2016 became the fifth currency, after the US dollar, the Euro, the yen, and the pound, to be part of the group of the Special Drawing Rights,

an international reserve of the IMF created in 1969 as a supplement of the currencies of its country members that can be exchanged for free in case of need, implemented its activity in the global finance in the years 2021 and 2022, during the pandemic – a new international recognition of its affordability (source: *Xinhua*, 11th April 2022).

Criticisms of the globalized Capitalism led by the USA have been done by a large group of Western economists (Krugman, Latouche, Rist, Lordon, Dardot, Laval, Stiglitz, Rodrik, Sapir, Mazzucato, Piketty, among others), but also in China some voiced about the risk for the Chinese political leadership to lead the world capitalistic system uncritically (like Wang Hui). The danger, already clearly identified in the previous decade in Europe, felt also in Africa, in Latin America, and now in Asia too, is that the globalization disempowers the peoples on behalf of the shareholders of corporations, favored by impersonal, international markets.

2. To me, as a disciple of Lê Thành Khôi, economist, historian, and comparative-educationalist, I approached all those problems in 2010 when I took the initiative to create an International Group of researchers on the Right to Education. My Maestro already made me observe how in the second half of the 20th century the distance between the rich and the poor in the world increased, and such distance was a problem for the Right to Education above all in the countries “in development”. In the ‘70s, Lê Thành Khôi had noted how the economical limitations imposed to the countries compelled to remain indefinitely “in development” penalized the right to the personal growth of the young born after the ‘68. On my side, I studied in addition to that the 2006 critical report by Katarina Tomacevski, the then Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on the Right to Education, where the author signaled how the aim of “Education for all”, a *conditio sine qua non* of development, was impeded just by the conditioned aids, paradoxically. In fact, the conditions of the loans obliged to minimize, say cancel the welfare policies because of the interests to pay. – A vicious circle.

By the way, I, in my capacities of educator, gave another direction to my research on this field; I deepened an aspect different from that cared about by Samir Amin (with whom I was honored to work on the theme) and Tomacevski. I realized another conception of the Right to Education that one could call *from inside, in sé*. More than the economic consequences of education, including the problem of the quote of budget devoted by the State to school, or the right to access the school and the right

to learn reading, writing, and calculating *plus* general notions of culture, I minded the Right to Education as finalized to the realization of the democracy, and *international* democracy rather than *domestic* democracy. The presupposition of that new conception of the Right to Education comes to me from the very practice of Comparative Education at the international level as an activist of the global movement of the World Council of Comparative Education. A basic knowledge of a *lingua franca* plus the capacity to using email and Internet allowed me to think, and to realize, a dialogue at distance with colleagues overseas and their students in a way to reflect together on the events of common interests that happened in the world. In truth, the free access to the websites of the major international newspapers allows everybody to get information on the most important events of common interest to the whole humanity. To me, according to my own professional experience, collecting and organizing information became a real duty for an educator who is seriously committed with educating to a democratic respect of the opinions of his/her students and his/her colleagues *all over the world*. Once collected information about the major events of the world and systematized it in a way to be usefully recovered in case of need in a group discussion, the educator is ready to put it at disposal of an educative group, say his/her classroom. When connecting that classroom with the classroom of another colleague in another part of the world, of course previously contacted, thanks to a social media (Whatsapp, Skype, Meet, Zoom), the setting is ready for a discussion and an exchange of opinions *at an international level*. Another important presupposition is that of the mental predisposition of mind to welcome a point of view different from his/her own, a problem that happens to be exaggerated by the differences of civilizations among the interlocutors. I called *Intercultural Intelligence* the capacity of our mind to overcome those civilizational differences (Pampanini, 2011). Finally, the predisposition to understanding which are the problems of *domestic* level and which those of *international* level completes the number of presuppositions needy to opening the way to an International and Intercultural Education functional to global democracy.

This narration of the personal trajectory of my practical and theoretical research explains the vision of the Right to Education that I reached after five years, 2010 to 2015, of coordinating the International Group on the Right to Education that I founded, intertwining it with the job of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations on the

Right to Education *after* Tomacevski, that is Vernor Munoz and Kishore Singh (they also took part in and contributed to that International Group). The Right to Education, to me, should be intended as the right to the comprehension of the biggest problems of humankind and to the expression of opinions on them to be exchanged in the international arena of the educational systems of the countries of all the world *activated by the educators*. The “telon de fondo” of that definition is a conception of democracy that is global; here, the “political theory of the educational institution” is not but an aggiornamento of John Dewey’s relationship between education and democracy as expressed in *Democracy and Education* (1916), inside and *outside* the domestic frontiers.

No wonder that I worked out the principal notions of such a conception – like *Intercultural Intelligence*, *Dialogue among Civilizations*, and *Orbital Classroom* – just in the same years in which other researchers, like David Held, Richard Sennett, Daniele Archibugi, Raffaele Marchetti, and others, advanced publicly their thought on “Global Democracy” – I do reference in particular to the publication of the “manifesto of Global Democracy” in June 2012 at the London School of Economics. I note that my approach to “Global Democracy” coincided with protests in the Arabic countries (*The Revolution of Jasmines*), in New York (*Occupy Wall Street*) and in Madrid (*los Indignados*), that had a particular political and economic meaning. From the beginning of the past decade up to the date, I formalized step by step my specific Theory of Global Democracy in my academic interventions, moving from the concrete and daily realizations *in the educational practice*. As it will be clear in the *Conclusion*, the thoughts on economics and Global Democracy that I am introducing today were born inside that general Theory of Global Democracy.

3. In the past decade, 2012-2022, the international political situation complicated because of a number of factors, including the strong China’s leadership by Xi Jinping (since 2012), Greece crisis (2013-2015), the nationalist government of India led by Narendra Modi (since 2014), the ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in Middle East and Africa (since June 2014), Brexit (2016), Donald Trump’ winning as the 45th USA President (2016), the return of center-right governments in Latin America in the second half of the decade, still, the Myanmar military coup in 2021, the persistency of

the “weak State” institutions in both Africa and Latin America, and finally the new war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022.

First, I note how the economical literature raised in that decade with reference to the economic inequality inside each State and among States. Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi aptly criticized the basic notion of GDP, and Martha Nussbaum associated a larger criticism to the governments which subordinate their policies to that notion. The debate on globalization and poverty enlarged from the research by Sen at the beginning of the millennium to the points *pro* globalization expressed by Martin Wolf and those *against* it by Thomas Pogge, Peter Singer, Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Dani Rodrik, Ha-Joon Chang, Jeromy Rifkin, and Anthony Atkinson. The approach to the micro-credit by Mohammed Yunus and that to the concrete life of the poor by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo helped in understanding better the dynamics of poverty, impoverishment, and the escape from poverty trap (more than the research by Paul Collier, to me). The financialization of economy has been studied not only by economists, like François Chesnais, but also by sociologists, like Saskia Sassen and Luciano Gallino. Eric Toussaint re-took and developed the idea of “odious debt”. Donatella della Porta noted how half of the world population and two thirds of the existing countries depend on the International financial Institutions – something that has been criticized by other philosophers and politics experts like Carlo Galli, Colyn Crouch, and Luigi Ferrajoli as well. Many have been the proposals to overcome Capitalism *while saving democracy*, both domestically and internationally. I appreciated the *critical liberal Cosmopolitanism* by Richard Beardsworth, the *pluralist internationalism* by Mathias Risse, and Samuel Moyn’s economical criticism to the human rights approach. In addition, I also evaluated the alternative ideas by Michael Albert, Robert Hahnel, and Claus Offe. The most interesting ideas, to me, include the following: applying the measures of the “universal income” and the “citizenship income” thought of as citizenship right (just like the right to vote: Philippe von Parijs); obliging Capitalism to the respect of the rules established by authorities democratically elected (Krugman, Stiglitz); conditioning the political mandate of the governments of the rich countries to measures in favor of the inhabitants of the poor countries (Nussbaum proposed to go beyond Cosmopolitanism by both material aid and the “capability approach”); approving international fiscal measures to tax speculative capitals in a way to support the ecological transition (Gael Giraux); giving

more value to work than to capital (François Morin); including the environment in the economical calculations (Partha Dasgupta). Clearly, in all those proposals the heritage of John M. Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, and Karl Polanyi is evident. I find that the books by two authors, Thomas Piketty and Mariana Mazzucato, are the most useful to the correct understanding of my theoretical principle enunciated in the *Introduction*.

Based on a solid historical background, Piketty has speculated about the point that is central to him: the “law” of Capitalism – that the profit tends to overcome both the product and the income – produces inequalities that in the long run become not-sustainable, both inside a country and among countries. Therefore, the challenge of democracy is that to control Capitalism without using neither protectionism, nor nationalism (Piketty, 2014 and 2020).

On her side, Mazzucato criticized the myth of the concurrence between the State and the private sector along with the model of capitalistic development based on the “free market” and the fast gain of the shareholder. She also solicits a responsible leadership of the economy based on a clear political vision oriented to the innovation, one that creates value for all, and not only for a few (her example is the *Green Industrial Revolution*), and that protects the public and common goods (Mazzucato, 2018 and 2021).

While Mazzucato aims to a true “theory of value”, focusing on a State dynamically cooperating with the private sector on behalf of a reasoned, shared, and democratic development, Piketty argues that spreading knowledge and more investments about competences and training are the keys for a large convergence between the rich and the poor inside each State and in the world.

Let us come back to my principle now: “Independently from the political party or the coalition of parties at the government in a given State, each State should commit to respect the quote of development attributed to it by the United Nations”, once ensured that the United Nations have been adequately reformed. Before entering the explication of the principal terms of that principle, that is the “quotes of development”, I need to explain briefly the other three principles of my Theory of Global Democracy, *because they come before it logically*. – After all, they are easy to be drawn from my trajectory already described.

My Theory of Global Democracy is *formal*, and it is composed by four principles. The first one is political as it affirms that “A country by alone cannot be defined democratic unless also its International Relations are democratically inspired” (Pampanini, 2019). At the very basis of this principle there is the notion of “people” taken by the Theology or the Philosophy of Liberation. Such conception refers to whatever people, and not to this or that people, or, worse, to this people *against* that people. It may look as a subtle distinction, but it is substantial: it impedes that, when speaking about “the power of people”, one minds “the power of this people *against* that people”, as it happens unfortunately too often today because of populism or, worse, nationalism. The *domestic* dimension of politics often implies such a bias. From this point of view, my Theory of Global Democracy makes it clear that the notion of people should be thought of *beyond* its national-statal limitations. Moreover, it should refer to *all* people of *all* the world, therefore non as a given people of a given State *only*.

I found in the elaboration of the notion of “world internal politics” by Jürgen Habermas, exposed in some of his books at the end of the past century, the closest theoretical “relative” to this principle. What I am now proposing by my Theory of Global Democracy, in fact, is nothing but a way to specify *which* “world internal politics”: exactly, a “global *democracy*”. A Global Democracy might live only inside a Parliament of the United Nations, where not only the governments, but also the representatives of all civilizations, even all the single *global citizens*, educated to *Global Citizenship*, could voice their opinions.

The second and third principles are of an educational and philosophical kind. They are the International and Intercultural Education, and the Dialogue among Civilizations, thought of as an educative practice. Based on the aforementioned “political theory of the educative institution” coming from Dewey, those two principles complete with each other. On using concepts like *Intercultural Intelligence* and *Orbital Classroom*, International and Intercultural Education just realized the Dialogue among Civilizations *from the bottom*.

Around the world, already educative practices do exist that refer explicitly to those concepts (Cristaldi, Majhanovic, Pampanini, eds., 2017). Their point of reference is the ideal of the *global citizen* of a *Global Democracy*. In fact, if the first principle represents the *political* nucleus of my Theory of Global Democracy, the second principle and the

third one about International and Intercultural Education and the Dialogue among Civilizations represent the *philosophical and educative* soul.

Let us see more in detail the fourth principle, the economic one. First, I want to make observe that it sounds as the exactly opposite of the basic principle of the Neorealism, which affirms: “No matter the government of a country in charge at a given moment of its history, that government should engage to make its country survive in the international arena *at whatever cost*”.

Secondly, moving from the Habermasian idea of “world internal politics”, I am just highlighting the theoretical need of a “world internal *economy*”.

As a proponent of a *formal* Theory of Global Democracy, I don’t need to identify precise institutional mechanisms or concrete political or socio-economical processes that, once put in practice, take to the realization of the enunciated theoretical ideal. To me, rather, it is important to define precisely the terms used in the exposed formal principles. For that reason, to conclude my *Argument* I need to deepen the critical notion of “quote of development”.

That notion is a “relative” to that of “resource”, but it overcomes and includes it. First, “resource” is a notion more complex of that, simple, of “good” used by John Rawls, because it comprehends the capacity to using the “good” that a person has *or has not*. Second, in the same line of the notion of freedom as *capability to choose and spectrum of choices* by Sen, “resource” comprehends an element of *free* choice: a person can evaluate, depending on her education, mentality, and even civilization, if acquiring the capability to use or not a given “good” deserves *or not* her efforts (if a person does not mind to use a given “good” in her life – in Sen’s sense, that is, she does not believe it is useful to realize the life that she thinks dignified to be lived – that “good” remains as neutral, and could be left to the use of another person). Finally, the “resource” is embedded in the concept of “quote of development” because its eventual use makes part of the style of life that a person acquires once she lives inside a given society with a given civilization and culture – *even in the contemporary globalized world*. As such, the “resource” represents for a person what the “quote of development” represents for a whole country or even civilization. Of course, a person, born inside a given

country and educated in a culture, can change her residence as well as her “civilization of reference”, *but that does not change the basic reasoning made here.*

Now, within a *global* conception of the political and economic life, rather than within a *domestic* one, it is important to fix the democratic, theoretical principle of the “quotes of development” among the quasi 200 existing countries. *It can be promoted and respected only by the United Nations* – if, as we said, the United Nations are democratically and multilaterally reformed, and endorsed with more instruments to put in practice the Dialogue among Civilizations, as already explained by the Cosmopolitan principles of my Theory.

In conclusion, the fourth principle of my Theory of Global Democracy offers a *preliminary*, global vision, just of principle, useful to develop thoughts on the welfare of all and each person inside the United Nations reformed along democratic and multilateral lines. It is realistic to assume that, given that domestic governments will keep alive on the political scene still for many years to come, in a way or in another, my fourth principle just puts clear the criterion for their basic behavior in the field of politics and economy on the international level. Whatever be the ideological orientation of a government, what matters is that it engages always with the respect of the quotes of development fixed in advance by the United Nations, that is, in that place where the peoples and the citizens have got the chance to discuss, accordingly with their civilizations and cultures, their vision of the world, of the life, and of the death.

Conclusions

I think that “*domestic* democracy” and “*global* democracy” are two notions completely different in nature, albeit opposed. The first one is the heir of the political tradition of *the only West*, and it pushes its horizon to admit even the war to keep its mission alive, which is the survival of its State. But in this way democracy falls in self-contradiction on an international level. Now, Confucianism and Islam too cannot escape such a paradox: their aspiration to universal peace justifies even violence against the non-adherents to their doctrines. The three ideologies, Western democracy, Confucianism, and Islam, share the love for the welfare of people – in fact, they all declare to aim to the peace and the welfare of people. Nevertheless, as my Theory of Global Democracy

makes it explicit, such notion of “people” is *domestic* – in fact, the three ideologies do reference to *their* peoples *in primis*. Overtly or covertly, Confucianism admits Han’s superiority on all other human ethnicities, while Islam historically privileges the Muslim *Umma*. From this point of view, the globalization of “peoples’ power”, of *all* the people, of *all* the world, inasmuch it is *not* of a given specific ideology, obliges *all* the three traditions of thought – Western democracy, Confucianism, and Islam – to overcome themselves *in the* Dialogue among Civilizations.

This does not mean that they should disappear, rather the opposite: it is just their persistence inside a future and desirable Parliament of United Nations, which is the first actor of a plausible “world internal politics and economy”, that should be considered as actually useful and precious, *because it warrants the dialectics, the tension, and the vitality of the world philosophical, political, and economic debate*.

From an economic point of view, my Theory of Global Democracy indicates the same venue, that is the Parliament of United Nations, as the place where, thanks to the Dialogue among Civilizations, the nations, in a process of unification, beyond the political contingent orientation of their governments, establish an agreement about the “quotes of development” thought of as consistent with a dignified life of all the cosmopolitan citizens.

My Theory of Global Democracy allows to overcome Samuel Huntington’s pessimistic vision of the *clash* among civilizations since it develops the opposite vision, the Lê Thành Khôi’s one, based on the trustworthy *intercultural dialogue*.

In conclusion, in my Theory of Global Democracy politics and economy go hand in hand to represent *economic development* not as the cause for *distancing* nations, rather the opposite, for *uniting* them. Such a trend could not be afforded if all *global citizens* do not contribute to it, and that is why the economic aspects of my Theory must be seen as strictly linked to the philosophical and educative principles of it.

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